Objective: To analyzethe seemingly contradictory resultsofthe Hanstudy (Pediatrics 2005)and the Del Beccaro study (Pediatrics 2006), bothanalyzing the effect of CPOEsystems on mortalityratesin pediatric intensive care settings. Methods: SevenCPOE systemexperts from theUnited States andEurope comment on these papers. Results: Thetwo studies are notcontradictory,but almost non-comparable due to differences in design andimplementation.They demonstrate therange of outcomesthatcan be obtained from introducinginformatics applicationsincomplexhealthcare settings. Implementing informatics applicationsisasociotechnicalactivity,which often dependsmore on the organizational context than on aspecific technology. As healthinformaticians,wemust notonlylearn from failures, but alsoavoidbothuncriticalscepticism that may arise from drawingoverly general conclusions from onenegative trial, as much as uncritical optimism from limited successfulones..
Introduction
Computerized physiciano rdere ntry (CPOE)thatsupports, among other options, the electronic ordering of drugs by physicians, hasbeen an importantareainmedical informaticsresearch for severalyears. Arenewedinterest hasrecentlycome largely as ar esult of the publication of the report by the Institute of Medicine estimating that thousands of deaths from medication errors mayp artiallyb ep revented by using computerized orderentry [1] .
Originalinvestigations [2, 3] have shown the benefits of using CPOE systems foroptimizing medication orderingand reducing adversed ruge vents (ADEs). More recent studies have confirmed thesefindings [4] [5] [6] [7] . However, it hasnot yetbeen concluded that reduction in medication errors andA DEs leadstoanimprovementinpatient outcome such as decreased mortality rates, as Garg andcolleagueshavenoted [5] .
Twor ecents tudiesh avef ocused on the effect of CPOE on the mortalityrates of intensivec arep atients in pediatric hospitals. Thef irstp aper,b yH an et al. [ 8] in 2005 from the University of Pittsburgh, analyzed mortality rates1 3m onths pre-implementation andfivemonths post-implementation of acommercial CPOE system. Their study wasrestrictedtochildrenthatwereadmitted to the Children's HospitalofPittsburghvia interfacility transport for specialized,t ertiary-levelc are. It wasf ound that after CPOE introduction,t he mortalityr ates increased dramaticallyf rom 2.8% (39 of 1394)t o6 .6%( 36 of 548). Hana nd colleaguess uggested thatr easons for the increased mortality rate included the inability to pre-registerpatients andtosubmitorders before patient'sa rrival,t he increased amount of time needed to enterorders,the reduction of oralc ommunication between physiciana nd nursesa fterC POE implementation,the relocation of drugs from the ward to ac entralp harmacy, andt echnical problems with stability andperformanceof network connections. Thea uthorsc oncludedthat"institutions should continue to evaluate mortalityeffects" in ordertodetect andprevent such problems.The Hanpaper caused al ot of discussion among researchers and practitioners, as reflected by commentaries [9] andletters to the editor in subsequent issuesofPediatrics.
In 2006,D el Beccaroa nd colleaguesi n Seattle [10] performed as tudys imilart o Han. TheDel Beccarogroup retrospectively analyzed the mortality rates1 3m onths pre-implementation andfiveand 13 months post-implementation of the samec ommercial CPOE systema tt he Children'sH ospital of Seattle.T heir study includeda ll patients thatw erea dmitted to their pediatric hospital. No significantc hangesi n mortality ratesw eref ound afterC POE implementation andi tw as concluded that "implementation of aC POE system,e ven in the early months afteri mplementation, wasnot associated with an increase in mortality".
Boths tudiesu sed comparablem ethods to assessthe effectsofthe samecommercial CPOE systemonmortalityrates for pediatric intensivecarepatients,but their conclusions differed. Without havingaclear explanation for those differences, health informaticists will notb ea blet ol earnf rom these case studies.T he objectiveso ft his papera re to analyzet he seeminglyc ontradictoryfindingsofthe Hanand the DelBeccarostudiesand to makerecommendations for furtherr esearch on implementing informatics systems.
Methods
To compare both papers,s even expertso n CPOE systems fromt he United States and Europe commentedo nt hese papers, with special focus on the contradictoryfindings. These expertsw ereselected based on their experience in the introduction and/or evaluation of CPOE systems.
Results -Expert Commentaries
Thef ollowing section presentst he expert commentaries, listeda lphabetically by author'slast name.
Joan S. Ash, Oregon Health & ScienceUniversity, Portland
Aftert he Hane ta l. paperw as published, severalofusexpressed,inanother Pediatrics paper [ 11] , our strong conviction thatt he CPOE system itselfs hould not be blamed for anyadverse outcomes, putting aside debate about the science of the research.The most important lessont ob el earnedf rom the Pittsburghstudyisthataflawedimplementation process, including some especially misguidedpolicy changes, caused organizationald istress and the potentialf or great harm.W hent he DelB eccaroe ta l. study appeared,itprovideddirect validation of ourthesis, because the samesystem, implemented differently, hassucceeded at the Seattle site.
Thereisagrowing body of literaturefeaturing lessons learned from CPOE implementations. Forexample, my research team hasb een reporting for an umber of years nowt hatC POE implementation success depends primarilyon1)time considerations (responset ime andu ser time), 2) meeting information needs( using orders ets),3 ) multidimensional integration (especially with workflow),4)the existenceofessential people (leadersa nd supports taff,p lus involved clinicians), 5) certain foundational underpinnings(e.g.trust between administratorsand clinicians), and6)improvement through evaluation andlearning (paying attentiontouser feedback) [12] [13] [14] [15] . ThePittsburghhospital hadissues surrounding allof these factors, while the Seattle hospitalpaid careful attentiont ot hem. We have also warned of unintendedconsequences such as morew ork for clinicians,u nanticipated workflowand system mismatches, changes in communication patterns, emotionalreactions, and newkindsorerrors [16, 17] , and againitappearsthatthe implementation at Children's Hospitalo fP ittsburghe xperienced allofthese. Fortunately, those at the Seattle children's hospital hadthe benefitof learning from Pittsburgh'sexperience. Now thatt he seconds tudyh as been published, decision makersand implementers have the benefitofbeing able to lookatboth papers side by side,tocompare them, andtotruly grasp their dramatic lessons.Unfortunately, the media hasshown little interest in the second paper, while the firstpaper caused quite astir.Weininformatics need to aggressively continue to gett he message out that a thoughtful implementation process, which is dependento na dequate resources, is the mostimportantcriterion for success.
David W. Bates, Brigham and Women's Hospital, Boston
TheH an study andt he DelB accaros tudy have provokedc onsiderablec ontroversy in the informaticsw orld. Thebackdrop to the Hanstudyisthatthis group doesresearch on outcomeso fp ediatric intensivec aref or those whon eed special care, andm anyo f themare transferred in fromoutside hospitals.W henC POE wasi mplemented, the group noted that things appeared to slow down in the careofthese children.Theythen used their database to assesswhether or not mortalityc hangeda ftert heyi mplemented CPOE. They found a2 .3-fold increase in their mortality rate fort he period after CPOE implementation,f or the specific group of children whow eret ransferred in. Theydid notreportthe mortalityratefor all children in the ICU, or for allpatients in the hospital. In their paper, Han et al. made muchofthe contrast between their findings, andareportf rom another group in Pittsburghs uggested af alli nt he adversed rug event( ADE)r atea fterC POE implementation,but thislatterreportused self-report to determine what the ADE rate was, and because self-reporto nlyi dentifies only about one in 20 ADEs,t his comparison is notreally meaningful.
In contrast,D el Baccaroe ta l. implementedt he samev endor'sC POE application,a lsoi nalargep ediatricsh ospital in intensivecare [10] . They also measuredthe impact on mortality, andfound atrend in a positived irection.I nc ontrast to the Pittsburghexperience, this group followedmany of the best practices for CPOE implementation.
So howcan these twodisparate results be reconciled?T here ares everal possiblee xplanations.One is that there wassome flaw with the Han study, andt hatt he investigatorsd id somethingl ikeo nlyr eportd ata for aspecificperiod,orthatatemporaltrend could have occurred.But morelikelyisthat the Pittsburghi mplementation wasd one poorly, andt hatt he increases in mortality thatw eref ound were relatedt od elaysi n carethatwereintroduced.Some of theserelatedtoCPOE butothers did not, anditisinteresting andinstructive to examine them.
First, CPOE wasi mplementedi nt he whole hospital over sixd ays. This made it extremely challenging to make changes quickly. Second,orderentrywas not allowed until the patient hadp hysicallye ntered the hospital-obviouslycreating particular problems for thisp opulation. This is ap olicy decision not directly relatedt oC POE. Third, afterC POE implementation,a ll medicationsincluding the vasoactive drugs were placed in the centralpharmacy. Fourth, the pharmacyw as not allowedt op rocess medication orders until aftertheywereactivated. Fifth, the decision wasm adet og o live without mostofthe necessaryordersets in place. Thes econd through fifth issues mighta ll have been addressed hadi mplementation been slower,and hadthese issues been identifieda si mportantp roblems in a pilot study.
Thes ingle mosti mportantt akeaway message from these studies is that implementing CPOE well is extremely important, andnot just of academic interest.Inparticular, it is absolutely essentialtopay closeattentiontothe socio-technicalaspects of implementation. These have been described [18, 19] , buts ome of the specific keys are strong leadership andl ong-termc ommitment, creating ac ulture of innovation,e xcellent project management, attentiont o clinical processes,and maintaining afocus on quality andsafety. Organizations that fail to do this do so at their peril. In particular, the clinical anda dministrative leadership need to be closelyinvolved,and need to ensure thatthe necessaryresources for asuccessful transition aremadeavailable. Overall, CPOE has awide arrayofbenefits,but achievingt hemd epends on using thist ool effectively.
Marie-Catherine Beuscart-Zéphir, Alain Duhamel,Evalab, University Hospital of Lille In this situation it is necessarytoassess the reliability of both studies from amethodologicaland statistical point of view, to assess the comparability of the studies,and to identify the underlying variables thatm ay account for the contradictoryresults.W ewill do so in the next paragraphs.
Reliability of theStudies
Table1summarizes the reliability of both studies.B oth arer etrospectiveo nes. Then no causal relationship can be demonstrated between the "Group" variable(before/after CPOE) andt he observedr esults.S ucha demonstration would requireap rospective study.I nt he Hane ta l. study unbalanced periods were analyzed.This could have induced abias, for example if there wasaseasonalvariability in the patients'clinical profiles. However, Han et al. compared their twopopulations using aset of the most important patients'c linical characteristicsi n pediatricICU,and theyfound no statistical differences. On the contrary, althoughD el Beccaroe ta l. analyzed matchingp eriods, their before/aftergroups provedtobedifferent. As ac onsequence, in the Del Beccaro study,the comparison of unadjustedmortalityr ates of the before/after groups is not valid. Contraryt ot he DelB eccaros tudy, Han et al. controlledthe potential confounding factors: thesef actors were introduced into am ultivariate logistic regression, in ordert op rovide adjustedo dds ratio [ 20] . Adjusted mortalityrates remainedhigher in the after-CPOE group. Finally, when Han et al.c omparedt he mortalityr ates on two balanced periods,t he resulting differences were closet ot hato bservedo nt he whole period.
Comparability of theTwo Studies
Besides their differences in statistical reliability, Han and Del Beccaro studies arenot actuallyc omparable, because the study populations arev eryd ifferent, as Table2 shows.
Thec onclusion is that the DelB eccaro study is NOTareplication of Han'ss tudy. Thus,t he results of the Del Beccaro study cannot opposeHan's results.
Boths tudiesb eing retrospectiveo nes, theyc annot demonstrate ac ausal relation between the installation of the CPOE and the observedm ortalityr ates. Then we are left with a" reasonables uspicion" that the installation of aC POE mighth aveh ad a negative impact on mortalityratefor afivemonth periodonavery specific population.
IdentifyingUnderlyingQualitativeVariables
Bothpaperstry to identifyunderlying qualitative variables thatcould account for their results.These supposed causal variables appear to be mostlyofhuman factors nature. Givent he "reasonables uspicion" mentionedabove,wefocus here on Han'squalitative report. Looking at the authors'comments on their work situation,ahuman fac-
Del Beccaro et al.
1) Retrospective study 1) Retrospective study
2) Unadjustedmortalityrate is significantlyhigher in the "after CPOE" group: p<.001 2) No significant difference between "before" and "after" CPOEgroups 3) 13 monthsbefore-5months after3 )13months before -13months after As ac onsequence, the results of this qualitative analysis have limitedv alidity: Objective systematic observation andquantification aremissing for most of the problems addressed; and:Anumber of problems or positivep ointsm ighth aveb een overlooked.
Conclusion
Studies on the impact of CPOE installation on healthcareo utcomesa re urgently needed.T hese studies should combine prospectivem ulti-centere valuationsw ith qualitative human factors analyses including usability ands ocio-technicala nalysis andassessment.The methodologicalquality of such studies is of utmostimportance if we want to rely on the results to improvet he quality of the informatics systems, of the organization of work, andultimately of the healthcareoutcomes [24] .
PeterL.Elkin, MayoClinic College of Medicine
Thes tudyb yH an et al.w as plaguedw ith systemsc hangesa round the implementation of their CPOE solution whichshould remind us that the systemsw ei mplement areu sed by real people whob ring to their taskstheir ownw ork habits, biases andexpectationsr egarding hows ystems should performand their ownexperience with prior systems. Inevitablyt hese pre-conditions influenceh ow systemsa re used andi ns o doing howeffectiveand safe will be the use of thesesystems.
Human factors engineering is the field whichd ealsw ith the usability of systems andprocesses [25] . In the article by Han et al. publishedi nP ediatricsi n2 005, there were ahostofhuman factors issueswhich, as shownb yD el Beccaroi nalaterP ediatricsa rticle in 2006,t urnedasafe implementation into an implementation thatled to an increased rate of fatalitiesw ithin their pediatric intensivec areu nit at the University of Pittsburgh.
All systemswork in an environment and areinfluenced by the organizationaland social issues. These issues are often expressed in part as the vision andmission of the organization. These factors createas ocial/ cultural environment that emphasizes certain work patterns.I ndividual work units createsubcultureswhich include embedded work patterns andw orkflows. Within these richa nd complexe nvironments each of us developss pecificw orkflowsa nd work habits based on our owne xperiences and backgrounds.W hens ystems arei mplementedt hese human factors requirec lose attentioninordernot to undo safetymechanisms thath aveb een put intop lace over time to provide best and safest practicefor our patients.
Human factors issuesthatw eidentified in the implementation of the Pittsburghsystemi ncluded: not allowing medication ordering prior to the patient'sa rrival at the hospital; at ime-consuming process was requiredtoenter an order(i.e. 1-2 minutes pero rder); orders etsa nd orders entences (fullyspecified orders) specific to the ICU setting were not built into the system;nurses needed an additional step to activateorders prior to the pharmacybeing able to work on filling the order; while the pharmacy was working on the patients ordern of urther orders could be enteredand the bandwidth wass ucht hats ometimes the computer screen appeared frozen.
Clearly,the system wasnot implemented in such aw ay as to take into account the workflows and humanfactors necessaryto provide optimal patientcareinthis intensive setting.O therf actors whichj eopardized patients afetyi ncluded moving the medi- In ordertofeel secure thatwhenweimplement systemsweare not endangering our patients'safety, we mustinsist that allsystems be subjected to formal usability testing.Usability testing is amethod employed in the fieldofhuman factors engineering. A usability study evaluates howap articular process or productw orks for individuals [26] . Optimally one would testapopulation of individuals whoa re as ample of typical usersofthe type of process or productbeing tested. It should be stated clearlytoparticipants thatt he purposeo ft he study is to evaluate the process or productand not the individual participant. [27] Usability sessions arev ideotapedf rom multiple angles (including the computer'sscreen image)and participants aree ncouragedt os hare their thoughtsv erballya st heyp rogress through the scenarios provided("think aloud") [28] . This helps to define the participants'behavior in terms of both their intentionsa nd their actions [29] .
To accomplishavalid study,o ne must followaspecificprotocol andhavemultiple participants (typically 6-12) interact with the system using the sames et of scenarios [30] . It is important thatthe design team be able to observe multiple participants if theya re to become informedb yt he study. Thescenarios should reflect the waythe systembeing tested is actuallygoing to be utilized [ 31] . Thec loser the study design can mimic the true end-usere nvironment, the morev alidity the results of the study will have [32] . In this manner, developersa scertain characteristicso ft heir application thata re functional, need improvement, fit user expectations, missexpectations, fail to function,o ra re opportunities for development [33] .
Human factors engineering in general andusability testing in specific arepowerful tools to help medical informaticians protect patients afetya sw ei mplement andu tilize CPOE systems.
Reed M. Gardner,University of Utah
Ifound the twoarticlesabout the failureand success of computerized physiciano rder entry(CPOE) in the journal Pediatrics and the subsequent commentary in Pediatrics [9] andaflurry of responses andcommentariesinothermedical journalshealthyand stimulating.Itisclear to me thatthe CPOE technology andmethodology is not yetmaturee nough to be assessed andj udgeda s ak itchenr efrigerator might be by the Consumer Union's Consumer Reports in the USA.
We as informaticists still have mucht o learnabout howtodesign, build andperfect complexs ystems that interact with and assist in the process of providing optimal health care. Severalyearsago while we were developing the HELP System at LDSHospital in SaltLakeCity,UT, USA, Ipresented Tutorials at the AmericanM edical InformaticsAnnualMeetings. Oneofmyfavorite slidess aidi ne ffect:W hatw ea re doing is 90% social and political ando nlya bout 10% technology.Ifurtheri llustratedt his supposition by presenting howwehad failed ands ucceeded in installing complexc omputerized decision supports ystems in the clinical setting.During thistime we hadthe opportunity to work with clinical colleagues ando ptimize the systemsw ed evelopeds o thatt heyfit into the workflowprocess and helped rather than hinderedp roviding patient care. We were not always successful, butt he teamwork efforto fi nformaticists, physicians,nurses, therapists andclerkswas crucial.
On abroaderperspectiveIfound it interesting thatt his learning process hadb een stimulatedbythe journalPediatrics. Idon't knowifthe pediatricianswerethe firstones brave enough to takeonthe challengeofoptimizing CPOE or if it wasasign of ourmaturity -t hatw ew eres till children in our understanding of howand what to do about CPOE!! In addition, Ifound that the ability to do electronic tracking andjournalrecall via electronic meansw as superb.F rom the comfort of my owno fficea th ome, Iw as able to usethe marvelousretrievaltools provided by the National Library of Medicine (NLM) andi ts excellent PubMed/Medline facilitiesand cross-referencing. Then, Iwas able to retrieve andr ead the relevant commentariesa nd articlesq uicklya nd easily. We arei ndeed into a" newe ra"o fi nformation access. Thanks to the NLM and the publishers forp roviding these remarkable tools!! To those whohaveand arecontinuing to publish their work in the fieldof CPOE, Is alute them for helping us learn. Sometimeswemustpublish failures -they arethe least fun andmostpainful to publish, butfrom themw ecan alllearn. Finally, we as informaticsm ustd evelop methods to better evaluate our work. The experimental methods andstrategieswecurrentlypossess are inadequate. We MUST develop more comprehensive andi nnovative evaluation methodologies anda pplyt heme very time we implement an ew informaticss olution. Much work still needst ob ed one in this area.
Some publicationsthathaverecentlyappeared on the topicf urther illuminate the challenges ando pportunities: we have to perfect CPOE [11, 34, 35] .
Antoine Geissbuhler,Geneva University Hospitals
Implementing the samec omputer-based system in different settingsu sing different strategiesleadstodifferent outcomes. This confirms what hasbeen demonstratedinthe information technology industryingeneral andi nc omplex environments such as hospitalsinparticular: technology representsa relatively smallf raction of the challenge when implementinginformation systems.
Information systemsa re not justc omputer-based systems. They encompass the whole flow of information amongsts takeholders,b ei tv erbal, handwritten or electronic,f ormal or informal. Thel ack of recognition of thisw ide scopea nd inherent complexity usuallyl eadst or isky approaches, wherec omputer-based systems aree xpected to drivei nstitutional change rather than moremodestly enabling it.
Giveni ts profound impact on carep roduction processes andi ts deep integration with many components of ah ospital information system,CPOE implementation is emblematic of these challenges. Several authors [13, 36] h aveh ighlightedp itfalls ands uccess factors for such implementations, whicha re well illustratedb yH an's andD el Baccaro'sr eports. These include end-users appropriation through proper governance of the project,e fficient ergonomics through the localization of order sets, and adequate training ands upporto f the users.
It hasa lsob een recognizedt hatc omputer-based systemsc annot be expected to enforceinapplicable rules, even if these are alreadyineffect.Insome situations, the implementation of such systemsunveils the inability to followrules,and,eventually, rules have to be changed, not to matcht he system'scapabilitiestoimplement them, butto matchthe institution'scapabilitiestofollow themresponsibly.Aclassical example with CPOE is the handling andformalization of "verbal" or "telephone"orders.
Considering the criticality of medical orderm anagementf or the safetya nd efficiency of the carep roduction process, it is crucial to monitor itsp erformance, in particularw hent he process is altered through computerization.I mmediate outcome measuresare useful to document the levelofappropriation andthe impact on the focal process itself. More distant outcomes, even thought heya re more difficult to measure andp rone to many confounders, areessentialtofollow as theyusually reflect the levelo fa chievement of institutional strategiest om anaget he quality ande fficiency of care.
Ac omplementary approach,w hich recognizest he multidisciplinaryd imension andt he institutional andd epartmental specificitieso ft he carep roduction processes,i st oa nalyze failurem odes, effects andc riticality using structuredm ethods [37] . This approach hasb een shownt oi ncrease the levelo fa wareness of potential risksb efore the implementation, andc an be used to identifya nd prioritize potential improvements.
Discussion
The methodological comparability of both studies is an issuet hath as been raisedi n many commentaries. Thea rgument in the DelBeccarostudysuggeststhattheir study wasareplication of the Han study. However, Beuscarta nd Duhamel conclude in their comment thatthe Hanand the DelBeccaro studies arenot trulyc omparable. Although the samec ommercial CPOE application wasevaluatedintwo different U.S. pediatric intensivecareunits, the organizationalcontext andthe selection of patientcases were different. In particular, the differencei n patientc ase selection anda lsot he limited study methodology of the DelB eccaro paperd on ot allowt od irectly compare the major findings, that is the change in mortality rates, of thesetwo papers.
This leadsu st ot he question:Whatc an we thenl earnf rom both studies?T here is one message thatstandsout in allcommentaries: implementingaclinical informatics application in health careisasocio-technicala ctivity:I tn ot onlyi nvolves makinga technicala rtefact availablei na no rganization,b ut also requiresa ligning the implementation of the technicalartefact with the formal andinformal organization andworkflow in the clinical setting [38] .Ignoring the existing organizationalw orkflowsa nd social interactionsi nt he redesign of clinical processes mayh aven egativei mpactso n clinical outcomesa sw as demonstratedi n the Han paper.The Hanand the DelBeccaro papers reinforceearlierresearch findings that concluded that the sameinformatics application mayb es uccessful in one organization andmay have negative effectsinanother organization [39] . Hencet he application as such is notnecessarilythe deciding factor,b ut rather the implementation process maybemuchmore important.
Givent he importanceo ft he implementation process, health informaticians should be as careful to avoid unwarranteds cepticismf rom an egativet riali nvolving an informaticss olution as theys hould avoid unwarrantedoptimism from another,apparentlyc ontradictoryp ositivet rialr esult. There areag rowing numbero fs tudieso n both commerciala nd home-grown CPOE systems. Negative trials,suchasthatofHan, areo ftenm uchm ore discussed (and often criticized)t hana re positive studies.H owever,the context of each study is very individual, giventhe manyfactors that influence informaticsimplementation projects; therefore,t he results reflect the individual situation anda re not easily generalizable.O ur challengeistoidentify the factors that may contribute to successful implementations andthe factors that mayhamperasuccessful result. Each study,beitpositiveornegative, helps us to recognize those factors and hencec ontribute to the evidenceb ase for health informatics [ 24] . So,o ur focus should not be "What did theyd ow rong? (Theyare to blamebecause …)",but more "What canwelearn from acase?" In fact, each study in itss pecificc ontext maye nlighten us on howt oa void negative consequences of implementing informatics technology in health care. Just as in experimentalmedicine,where it is imperative and ethicaltoreportthe effectiveness of experimentaltreatments in the literature, independent of their positiveornegativeeffects, it is imperative ande thical to report on implementations of informatics applicationsi n health organizations [22] . Therefore,weapplaud Hanetal. forthe courage to reporton the negative effects.
Thes tudyo fD el Beccaros hedl ighto n howadifferent implementation strategy can make adifferenceinoutcome,but their own study design wastoo limited to permit comparison with the Han study. Ye t, by highlighting howt he implementation process can impact the success or failureo fa ni nformatics application andleading to strong reactionsa nd discussions,t heyd emonstratedt heir value andc ontribution to our evidence base on thei mplementation of informatics applications in health care, as did the earlierpaper of Koppel [40] andthe subsequent discussions of it.This evidence base is built on the collection of systematic scientific studies on factors for success and failureofimplementation projects(such as [41] ). We believethatacomprehensive evidenceb ase will lead to clear implementation guidelinesthatare crucial for increasing the chance of successful implementations in practice [42] .
It hasoftenbeen arguedthatinformatics systemsi nh ealth cares hould be evaluated in r andomized controlledt rials (RCT). TheH an andt he DelB eccaros tudiesa re warning signs to us andshowthatthe implementation process andt he organizational context of an informaticsa pplication is as pivotalasthe implemented application itself for success. When we do not control for all confounding factors during the implementation, an RCT of aclinical informaticsapplication is equivalent to doing an RCT with ageneric drug,but leaving the decision on the routeofadministration, the total dose, as well as the dosage schemeuptothe treating physicianand still makingajudgment about the efficacy(or effectiveness) of the drug.
Theq uestion is whetherw er eally can controlt he implementation process.I n medicine,wehaveobservedthatsome treatments areeffectiveinsome patients andnot in others.The variedgenetic make-up of patients mayaccount for the different results. Similarly, in health informaticssome applicationswork in one environment andnot in others.Touse apotentiallyusefulevolutionarymetaphor,the "genetic make-up" of the organization plays arole in thisrespect,including the formal andinformal workflows in the organizations andt he established practices thattypicallycounteract situations wheret hings might go wrong. In other words,the organization's"immunesystem" is acritical,though often underappreciated elementt hatc annot be ignored.The introduction of an informaticssystem intoanorganization hasa nalogies to implanting an artificialorgan in ahuman: youeitheradapt the artificialo rgan to be acceptedb yt he body or yousuppress the rejection reaction by the immunes ystem. Thel atterm akes a human vulnerabletoall kinds of infections andc an lead to as eriouslyc ompromised person. Let'sa void compromising our health system by forcing it to suddenlyacceptr igidly-designedi nformatics applicationso nt he basiso fn arrowlyd efined, purely technologicalb enefits.T hese systems mayd estabilizeo ur health organizationsi ft heya re not properlya dapted to humans andt heir organizational" immune systems" with the care,time,and constructive feedback thatc an lead to appropriate changesindesign andimplementation that really do improve health careo utcomesi n the longterm.
Givent he discussed importance of the implementation process andt he organizational context, well-trained health informaticians mayw ellbethe "missing links" between clinicians andt echnologists, who can help usersingood underlying methods of assessment, as well as the critical training in information management andh ealth informatics. Expert informaticians help users to betteru nderstand the complexity of informaticss olutions andt ot akei ti nto account when planning anyinformatics implementation, thus reducing frustration and increasing the chance of success. Recommendationsf or the education of health informaticians have longb een in place [43] . Severalb achelor andm aster programsi n health informaticshavebeen initiatedinthe last3 0y ears. Therea re strong collaborationsc urrentlyo ng oing to pursue best education of health informatics(e.g.http:// www.iphie.org [44] ); also shorter programs directed at clinicians,s ucha st he AMIA 10 × 10 program (http://www.amia.org/ 10 × 10), promote quality training. As technology becomesm ore mature andp ervasive,the coursesneed to emphasize good implementation practices as well as the pitfalls andp erils of informaticsi mplementation in the clinical setting.Formal training in the evaluation of informatics applications in clinical settingss hould be part of these Medical Informatics curricula [22] .
Astrong remark should be made regarding the negative reactionstothe Hanpaper. We have arguedthatitisimportanttohave these studies appear in the literature, even thought heyh ighlightt he negative side of informatics in health care. Thea uthors should be protected againstt he flurry of criticisms thathaveappeared in the popular press and in the scientific literature. The authors have reportedonwhatcan go wrong when insufficientattentionispaidtoexisting, provenc linical practice, andw hent he implementation of an informaticsa pplication is made to "improve" the overallorganizationale fficiencya nd to whicha ll have to adapt. Givent he reactionsi nt he popular press and the scientific literature, there is the riskt hati nt he future selfcensorship will keep the negative studies from being presented in the scientific literature,l eading to as trong publication bias [45] . The position andf uturec areerso f authors should not be at risk because of negative study findings. We mustlearnfrom errors -mostlyfrom our ownerrors! Since patients'l ives mayd ependo no ur informatics applicationsand howtheyare implemented [46] , we cannot acceptself-censorship or avoid reporting of errors that others of our colleaguescould also make.
Finally, we want to emphasize the need to promote systematic evaluation studies with strong methodologiesfor assessing the manysocio-technicalfactors that influence the introduction of increasinglys ophisticated computertechnologies withinc omplexh uman organizations.P eople within these organizations have the ability to resist [47] , andc ertainlyc ritically affect howa technology actuallyw orks, rather than how it wasd esignedt ow ork. Studies on introducing informatics technology in health carei sb eb est done prospectively, so promoting assessmentc riteria ands tatistically well-controlleds tudyd esigns in as cientifically rigorous mannerb yu nbiased and disinterested medical informaticsorganizationsi si mportant [ 24] . It might even help counteract the uncritical technology-driven adoption of systemsa sm ucha st he often hypercritical retrospectivecommentary that arises when things go wrongwith the implementation of atechnology in the absence of properlydesignedprospectiveorretrospective studies.
Conclusion
Implementing informatics applicationsi n health careisprimarilyasocio-technicalactivity.E ach setting is uniquei ni ts combination of sociological, technical, organizational andhuman factors. However, each evaluation study (especially those with negative results)helps to clarify andtoimprovet he evidenceb ase of health informatics. We ll-educated health informaticians, using systematically developed implementation guidelinest hatt akei nto account the socio-technicali ssues, can increase the chance of successful implementations of health informaticsa pplications. Rigorous assessments tudies, based on evaluation guidelines,can supportearly detection andprevention of adverseevents that mayoccur. While it is neverpossibletoforesee allp ossiblea dverse effectsp rospec-tively,g ood study design can help avoid reaching unwarrantedconclusions from ignoring possiblec onfounding effectsr etrospectively -thereby leading to constructive feedback for future study design andsystem implementation. All thesea ctivitiesc ontribute to the emergenceo ft he evidence base of health informatics.
